The Extraterritorial Application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 by Coffin, J. Thomas
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 23
Number 3 Spring/Summer 2000 Article 11
1-1-2000
The Extraterritorial Application of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996
J. Thomas Coffin
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Thomas Coffin, The Extraterritorial Application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 23 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 527
(2000).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol23/iss3/11
The Extraterritorial Application of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996
BYJ. THOMAS COFFIN*
I. Introduction
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton was "pleased"' to sign
into law H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),
which took effect on January 1, 1997 In his statement accompanying
the signing of the bill, the President noted that "[e]conomic espionage
and trade secret theft threaten our Nation's national security and
economic well-being.... This Act will protect the trade secrets of all
businesses operating in the United States, foreign and domestic alike,
from economic espionage and trade secret theft.... " In a post-Cold
War United States in which the nation's security is increasingly linked
to its economic strength, the EEA had sailed through Congress with
broad bi-partisan support.
The EEA, though a meager nine sections of the Federal Code,4
packs a significant punch, at least on paper. Section 1832 imposes a
fine of up to five million dollars and imprisonment for up to ten years
for the "theft of trade secrets."5 If the theft is on behalf of a foreign
government, or on behalf of a foreign "agent" or "instrumentality"
(as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 1839), then section 1831 labels it
"economic espionage" and the maximum prison term and fine are
* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 2000. The author is currently an associate
at the San Francisco office of Morrison & Foerster, LLP and may be reached at
tcoffin@mofo.com.
1. President William J. Clinton, Statement upon signing H.R. 3723, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4035 (1996), [hereinafter Clinton Statement].
2. See Victoria Slind-Flor, New Spy Act to Boost White-Collar Defense Biz, 19
NAT'L L.J 1 (1997).
3. Clinton Statement, supra note 1, at 4034.
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. 1998).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
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increased to fifteen years and ten million dollars, respectively.
6
However, the legislative history indicates that the stiffer penalties of
section 1831 do not apply to foreign corporations unless they are
"substantially controlled" by a foreign government.7
Both section 1831 and section 1832 contain the same broad
definition of what actions potentially constitute criminal theft of a
trade secret8 - with "trade secret" itself also broadly defined by the
statute Given the relatively spare - yet broad - terms of the EEA,
Congress clearly intended a significant role for the federal courts to
fill in the gaps. Indeed, some people within high-tech industries,
despite their interest in protecting trade secrets, worried that the
EEA was too vague - perhaps even unconstitutionally vague." Given
the highly technical nature of many of the disputes, the EEA
provisions - and the possibility of an inexperienced federal court
applying them - might inject a level of uncertainty in business
relationships.
To further broaden the reach of the EEA, Congress specified the
same penalties for conspiracy to steal trade secrets.1 And although
the EEA does not provide a private cause of action by its terms, it
does allow the Attorney General to file a civil action to obtain
injunctive relief.' (The EEA, however, is specifically intended not to
preempt any pre-existing civil remedies. 3) Finally, perhaps
anticipating some concerns with the potential criminal scope of the
EEA, Congress provided that the district courts may take "into
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
7. 142 CONG. Ruc. S12201-03 (Oct. 2, 1996) (Manager's Statement)
("Enforcement agencies.., should not apply section 1831 to foreign corporations
when there is no evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated
intelligence activity.... [T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the activities of the
company are, from a practical and substantive standpoint, foreign government
directed.")
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(2) and § 1832(a)(2) (both apply the statute to one who
"without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads,
uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret").
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4), which generally adopts the common law definition of
"trade secret."
10. Stephen C. Glazier, Secret Snares: Beware the New Federal Trade Secrets Act,
for it May Criminalize Unauthorized Use in Highly Ambiguous Cases, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1996, at B25.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) and § 1832(a)(5).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1838.
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consideration the nature, scope and proportionality of the use of the
property in the offense" when imposing its sentence. 4 Of course, this
provision only comes into play once criminal liability has already
been established. Thus, overall, the EEA provided very broad and
potentially very tough new criminal sanctions to a field previously
dominated by civil remedies. Commentators at the time of the EEA's
passage almost uniformly recognized the bill's significance, at least on
paper: "The only remaining question is whether Federal authorities
will be inclined to prosecute as criminal violations those matters that
were traditionally resolved as private commercial disputes.""5
Against the background of those sweeping measures, Congress
went one step further: it stated categorically that it intended the act to
apply to extraterritorial conduct. Section 1837 states:
This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United
States if - (1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or
permanent resident alien of the United States, or an organization
organized under the laws of the United States or a state or political
subdivision thereof; or (2) an act in furtherance of the offense was
committed in the United States.
16
The ramifications and scope of this provision of the EEA will be
the focus of this Note. As will be detailed below, where the
legislative branch is silent, courts have traditionally applied a
presumption against the extraterritorial application of the terms of a
statute. This does not, of course, mean that the courts have been
unwilling to give extraterritorial effect to statutory terms. But it does
mean that, where a statute is silent on the matter, the prosecution
would have the burden of showing that the statute should be
construed to cover conduct beyond the borders of the U.S. in a
criminal case. However, in an action under the EEA, Congress has
intentionally relieved the prosecution of that burden. Still, the broad
terms of section 1837 make it very clear that the courts will be
necessary to delimit the scope and application of the EEA as it relates
to conduct outside the United States.
This Note represents an attempt to address the latter issue. The
ultimate goal here is to provide a guide to U.S. persons (corporate
and individual) operating abroad as well as foreign persons who may
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(2).
15. Chaim A. Levin, Economic Espionage Act: A Whole New Ballgame, NEW
YORK L. J., Jan. 2, 1997, at 5.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
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be subject to personal jurisdiction within the U.S. Section 1837 of the
EEA, liberally construed, has the potential to cover conduct abroad
whose perpetrators may be entirely unaware of the EEA, may not
consciously consider themselves subject to U.S. law, and may in fact
not be doing anything illegal within their country of operation. Given
the relatively recent enactment of the EEA, this Note will, of
necessity, be largely extrapolatory and theoretical in nature. Through
March of 2000, while the U.S. had filed charges in at least eighteen17
cases under the EEA, there were only two cases which had produced
published decisions in criminal prosecutions under the EEA - and
only one of those two even tangentially involved an issue of
extraterritorial conduct. Hence, the issue of the extraterritorial scope
of the EEA remains largely unresolved today.
Part II of this Note will focus on the Congressional intent behind
the EEA, as well as enforcement actions to date under the statute.
However, neither Congress nor the courts have satisfactorily outlined
the extent of the extraterritorial application of the EEA to date.
Thus, following Part II will commence the analysis of the potential
scope of the EEA abroad, beginning in Part III with a discussion of
the theories behind the extraterritorial reach of U.S. federal law.
Because the extraterritorial reach of the EEA has yet to be invoked
in practice, Part III will provide a fairly detailed theoretical
background to set the stage for Parts IV and V. Part IV will provide a
brief comparison of the application overseas of the statutes in two
areas of federal criminal law: antitrust and securities law. In both of
these areas of law, the courts have had substantial opportunities to
apply statutory provisions to conduct occurring abroad, and the
common law which has developed in these areas may be instructive in
predicting the extraterritorial scope of the EEA. Finally, in light of
the discussion in the prior three sections, Part V will provide
guidelines to interested parties regarding conduct that may
potentially subject its perpetrators to criminal or civil sanctions under
the terms of the EEA.
17. See R. Mark Halligan, Reported Criminal Arrests under the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (visited April 7, 2000)
<http://www.execpc.com/-mhaUign/indict.html>.
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H. The Extraterritorial Application of the EEA to Date
A. Congressional Intent Regarding the Extraterritorial Reach of
the EEA
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 in some ways represented
a very sudden shift in the level of federal protection of one form of
intellectual property: trade secrets. After all, prior to the EEA's
passage, there was no criminal legislation aimed directly at trade
secrets, and civil protection of trade secrets in court was more
unpredictable and erratic than it was for other forms of intellectual
property, such as patents and trademarks. Suddenly, after the EEA's
passage, the pilfering of trade secrets subjects the defendant to far
stiffer criminal sanctions than does the "theft" of any other form of
intellectual property.
In its statement of purpose accompanying the final bill, the
House made very clear its intent that a prime target of the EEA was
the foreign agent who would appropriate trade secrets of an
American company. While acknowledging that the theft of trade
secrets may be perpetrated by one U.S. company against another, or
simply by a disgruntled employee, the House stated a greater
concern: "[m]ore disturbingly, there is considerable evidence that
foreign governments are using their espionage capabilities against
American companies."18 Indeed, it is worth noting that the bill as
originally submitted by Congressman McCollum only applied to trade
secret theft on behalf of a foreign government or its representative. 9
It was only as a result of concerns that such a bill might violate certain
treaty obligations that the EEA was later altered to cover theft on
behalf of domestic entities as well.'
The House Report incorporated FBI director Louis Freeh's
testimony that the FBI had investigated allegations of economic
espionage activities by agents or organizations from 23 different
countries - many of which are traditional American allies.2' The
House also cited a survey which indicated that 21 percent of
identified participants in economic espionage were foreign nationals
and which estimated losses of $63 billion annually to U.S. industry
18. H.R. RP. No. 104-788, at 5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 4021,4023.
19. See James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of
1996,5 TEx. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 177, 187 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4024.
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due to foreign economic espionage.' (The latter number is actually
lower than some other estimates not cited to Congress.')
Section 1831 of the EEA states that anyone who intends or
knows that a "benefit" will be conferred upon a foreign party via the
theft of a trade secret is subject to criminal sanctions.' Congress
specified that "benefit" is to be interpreted broadly:
The defendant did not have to intend to confer an economic benefit
to the foreign government, instrumentality, or agent in any way.
Rather, the government need only prove that the actor intended
that his actions in copying or otherwise controlling the trade secret
would benefit the foreign government, instrumentality, or agent in
any way. Therefore, in this circumstance, benefit means not only
an economic benefit but also reputational, strategic, or tactical
benefit.25
This obviously is an unintimidating burden for the prosecution to
clear, and in fact, it is a lower burden of proof than the case in which
the defendant does not act on behalf of foreign governmental
interests: "when the defendant does not act with the intent to benefit
a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent, the government must
also show that the defendant intended to disadvantage the rightful
owner of the information."'' To the extent that actions taken abroad
that are covered by the extraterritorial application of the EEA in
section 1837 are more likely to be on behalf of a foreign interest, this
lower standard of proof under section 1831 has the effect of
broadening the extraterritorial reach of the EEA. As for section
1837, Congress specifically stated that it was inserted to "rebut the
general presumption against the extraterritoriality of U.S. criminal
laws."27 To curb the potential extraterritorial reach of the EEA
somewhat, Congress also provided that personal jurisdiction would be
lacking unless a natural person defendant is a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident; if the defendant is a corporate person, personal
jurisdiction requires that the company be owned or controlled by U.S.
citizens or permanent residents or that it be incorporated within the
22. See id.
23. Another estimate attributed $105 billion in losses from economic espionage
to Japan alone. See Neal R. Brendel & Lucas G. Paglia, The Economic Espionage
Act, PA. L. WKLY., July 7, 1997 at 12.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4030.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4033.
[Vol. 23:527
2000] The Extraterritorial Application of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 533
United States.' However, to cover individual offenders not under the
above rubric, Congress prescribed extraterritorial jurisdiction if "an
act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States"'29 - which has the effect of limiting the limitations of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The broad criminal application of the EEA even to events
overseas has multiple advantages to U.S. companies, particularly
smaller U.S. companies. The latter often do not possess sufficient
resources to challenge large multinational defendants in a civil action,
especially where extensive discovery abroad is necessary.' The EEA
as written could also be a particularly important asset, for example, to
a small U.S. company which exposes some of its trade secrets in a
joint venture overseas (assuming U.S. courts can obtain jurisdiction).
A criminal conviction under the EEA could go a long way toward
proving the plaintiff's case in a civil action for trade secret
misappropriation." However, the Department of Justice alerted U.S.
industry at the outset that federal prosecutors would not be filing
EEA charges at the drop of a hat. In a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee immediately prior to the bill's passage, Attorney General
Janet Reno stated that, at least during the initial five years of the
EEA, no charges under the Act would be filed absent the direct
approval of the Attorney General or two specified representatives. 2
As at least one set of commentators has noted, the invocation of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law under section
1837 would presumably require some definable national interest.33
Otherwise, as those commentators point out, the EEA would apply in
a case where the Algerian government acquired through espionage
the trade secrets of a Tunisian company, so long as at least one act in
furtherance of the crime occurred within the U.S. - or even if all the
acts occurred abroad, so long as the perpetrator was a U.S. national
or permanent resident.' Such a hypothetical vividly illustrates the
28. Id.
29. 1d
30. See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & John R. Bauer, The Next War? Federal
Prosecutors Focus on Intellectual Property Crimes, B.B.J., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 20-21.
31. See Brendel & Paglia, supra note 23.
32. Lorin L. Reisner, Criminal Prosecution of Trade Secret Theft, 219 N.Y.L.J. 1,
4 (1998). The other two DOJ officials who may approve an indictment under the
EEA are the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division.
33. See Pooley, supra note 19, at 204.
34. See id.
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need for prediction as to where the DOJ will draw the line in
prosecuting under the EEA, as well as where the courts will draw the
line in applying the EEA to extraterritorial conduct.
B. The Economic Espionage Act in the Courts:
Federal Criminal Actions Under the EEA to Date
Through March of 2000, only two actions filed pursuant to the
EEA had proceeded sufficiently far in the court system to generate
published decisions, though quite a few other cases were pending or
had settled quickly." Most likely, as many commentators had
predicted, this was a result of the DOJ's pursuing only clear-cut cases
of trade secret theft in the early years after the passage of the EEA.
Thus, not surprisingly, to this point, the prosecution's rate of success
in EEA actions has been very high - apparently 100 percent.6 Also,
despite the fact that the EEA as originally proposed only covered
trade secret theft on behalf of a foreign governmental entity, there
has, through early 2000, yet to be a single case prosecuted under
section 1831's economic espionage provisions.' Overall, though, the
DOJ appears to be falling short of its estimate during Congressional
hearings that it would prosecute about fifty cases under the EEA
during its first six years.
The only case under the EEA so far to have reached a published
decision with any international implications whatsoever is that of
United States v. Hsu. It was originally filed in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania39 and was then subject to an interlocutory appeal to the
Third Circuit.' In this case, the government charged three Taiwanese
nationals with attempting to steal the formula and method of
production of Bristol-Myers Squibb's anti-cancer drug Taxol.41 Two
of the defendants were arrested when they went to meet with an FBI
agent posing as a courier of the technical information sought.42
A third defendant indicted in the case, one Jessica Chou,
apparently remains in Taiwan, which has no extradition treaty with
35. See Halligan, supra note 17.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. H. R. REP., supra note 18, at 4028.
39. See United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
40. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
41. Pamela B. Stuart, The Criminalization of Trade Secret Theft: The Economic
Espionage Act of 1996,4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 373,382 (1998).
42. See id.
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the U.S.?3 Because the three defendants were evidently attempting to
pilfer the trade secrets in question solely for their Taiwanese
employer, there was no intimation that the Taiwanese government
was in any way involved.' Hence, the action was filed only under 18
U.S.C. § 1832 (1996)." As for the extraterritoriality provisions of
section 1837, it was unnecessary for the court to address the issue
since the majority of the conduct in furtherance of the trade secret
theft - including the ultimate meeting at which the two defendants
were arrested - occurred on U.S. soil. However, if Ms. Chou is ever
indicted in this country, the provisions of section 1837 may apply,
since the facts as related by the court seem to indicate that her
participation was limited to phone calls and e-mail from Taiwan.'
After remand, Mr. Hsu eventually pled guilty on March 31, 1999;
there remains an outstanding warrant for Ms. Chou.'
Only two other cases with international implications have been
filed under the EEA through March of 2000. In United States v. Pin
Yen Yang, et al., two Taiwanese nationals were accused of stealing
documents containing the trade secrets of Avery Dennison, a
California-based adhesive products manufacturer - having been
supplied with said documents by an employee of Avery Dennison.'
In United States v. Huang Dao Pei, the defendant, a Chinese-born
naturalized U.S. citizen and a former employee of Roche Diagnostics
in New Jersey, was indicted under the EEA for allegedly attempting
to purchase trade secret information from his former employer for
use in his own business operations in China. 9 Neither case involved
an indictment under section 1831 of the EEA since no foreign
governmental entity was involved in the alleged trade secret theft.
Indeed, through March of 2000 there has not been a single
indictmente under the "economic espionage" section of the Economic
Espionage Act, despite the fact that, as noted above,'1 the initial
impetus for the EEA was to combat economic spying perpetrated by
foreign governments.
43. See id. at 383.
44. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 191-92.
45. See id. at 193.
46. See id. at 191-92.




51. See Pooley, supra note 19.
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Thus, apparently, there has not been a single case filed to date
which has necessitated the invocation of the extraterritoriality
provisions of section 1837. Given the complete dearth of case law on
the subject, in order to estimate the limits of the EEA's application
overseas, it will be necessary to look at the theories underlying the
extension of U.S. law abroad - and then examine the extraterritorial
exercise of select federal criminal statutes possessing more detailed
common law development. This will be the focus of Parts III and IV.
IlM The Territorial Bases for the Extraterritorial Application of
U.S. Law
The federal courts have been defining and refining the scope of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law for the better part of the
twentieth century. For the most part, they have been doing so in the
context of evaluating whether or not to apply an American statute
abroad - where Congress has not specifically provided for
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the discussion below is
equally applicable to the EEA since Congress in section 1837 has only
instructed the courts generally that the reach of EEA extends
overseas - it made little attempt to influence the courts as to the
scope of that section. The background treatment in this Part will of
necessity be somewhat truncated, given that it could be, and has been,
the subject of entire books. The goal here is to provide a general
outline of the different theoretical bases for extending the application
of U.S. law abroad. One or more of them almost certainly will be
invoked when the time comes to apply the EEA extraterritorially,
and they will form the background to the predictions and issues
discussed in Part V of this note.
Though different sources sometimes apply different labels, there
are five general bases for prescribing U.S. jurisdiction over events
abroad which the federal courts have cited. 2 The first is nationality: a
state may assert jurisdiction over its citizens wherever they are
located." The second basis is effects: a nation may potentially claim
jurisdiction where there is conduct abroad which produces substantial
effect within the territory of that nation.' The third basis is
52. See Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the
Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
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protective: there is potential jurisdiction when an act abroad impacts a
nation's national security.5 The fourth basis is universality: any
nation may claim jurisdiction over events universally considered to be
"crimes against humanity," whether or not they had any impact on
that nation or its citizens. 6 The fifth basis is passive personality: a
nation may claim jurisdiction whenever the victim of an act is one of
its citizens.' U.S. courts have, at one time or another, invoked each
of the above bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and all are now
embedded within the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
(Restatement).' With the exception of the universality principle,
which is disregarded in the discussion below, each of the above bases
of jurisdiction could potentially apply under section 1837 of the EEA.
A. The "Nationality" Basis of Jurisdiction
This principle of jurisdiction, ensconced in § 402 of the
Restatement, 9 is a relatively uncontroversial basis for the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least when applied to natural persons.
In its sparest form, it simply states that "[a] state may... punish acts,
wherever committed, by nationals of such state." It is probably safe
to say that most nations have an interest in asserting jurisdiction over
their citizens wherever they are. 1 This, of course, does not imply that
a nation's interest is superior in any given case simply due to the
involvement of its citizen. Indeed, such nation's interest is often
inferior to the interest of the nation in which the events occurred, and
the invocation of the nationality principle alone has rarely been
sufficient to justify prosecution. 2 While the U.S. traditionally has
enforced the nationality principle most stringently in the area of tax




58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 402-03 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
59. See id. § 402(2).
60. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 388 (1981).
61. See Mark Petersen, Note, The Extraterritorial Effect of Federal Criminal
Statutes: Offenses Directed at Members of Congress, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 773,783-84 (1983).
62. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, reporters' Note 1.
63. See id.; see also Estey, supra note 52, at 182.
64. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, reporters' Note 1.
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The seminal case in this area of jurisdiction as applied in the U.S.
is Blackmer v. United States.' In this case, the Supreme Court upheld
a subpoena directed to a U.S. national residing in France, stating that
the "jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen... is a
jurisdiction in personam" wherever that citizen may be located.' The
application of the nationality principle in that case was simplified by
several facts: it was the U.S. citizen himself who contested the
principle's application; the country in which the resident was located
did not have a strong interest in the matter; and Congress specifically
provided for the extraterritorial application of the statute in
question." Nonetheless, it set a U.S. precedent for applying the
nationality principle which was later extended to other areas of law.
The basis under international law for applying the nationality
principle to parties other than natural persons is more questionable.
The U.S. specifically claims that the nationality principle does apply
to "juridical" as well as natural persons.' Generally speaking, the
"nationality" of a corporation or similar entity is that of the nation
under whose laws it is organized.69 Nonetheless, section 414 of the
Restatement notes the U.S. view that "it may not be unreasonable for
a state to exercise jurisdiction for limited purposes with respect to
activities of affiliated foreign entities" in certain enumerated
situations.0  Many other developed countries, including Great
Britain,7 reject even a limited application of jurisdiction in such a
case, leaving the jurisdiction of foreign subsidiaries solely under the
control of the state of incorporation.'
B. The Effects Basis of Jurisdiction
The effects basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which in
principle is generally accepted by the international community,7
simply states that a nation has a valid claim of jurisdiction over
65. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
66. Id. at 438.
67. See id.
68. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402 cmt. e.
69. See id.
70. RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 414(2), and cmts. c through e of section 414
for examples of the potential exercise of jurisdiction over affiliated foreign entities.
71. See Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries:
Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 366
(1983).
72. See id. at 366-67.
73. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, cmt. d.
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"conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory.74"' The paradigmatic situation to
which most countries would be willing to allow "effects" jurisdiction
is the case in which a defendant in country A has fired a gun across
the border and injured a party in country B.7' The U.S., however,
views the effects basis of jurisdiction as extending significantly
beyond such obvious scenarios - including, controversially, economic
effects within this country.76
The effects basis of jurisdiction has often been viewed as a subset
of a more general jurisdictional basis: territoriality.' This is the
universally recognized principle that a nation has jurisdiction over
any conduct which occurs within its borders without regard to the
nationality of the actors. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court at the beginning
of this century applied a literal view toward the territorial principle.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,79 the first case which
presented an attempt to apply American law extraterritorially,' the
Court refused to apply statutory provisions to actions which took
place entirely beyond U.S. borders. Writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes stated that "[t]he general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done.""
This application of "strict" territoriality, though influential for
some forty years (most notably in the field of antitrust law),' would
not survive long without modifications. Ironically enough, it was
Justice Holmes himself who, only two years after American Banana,
articulated what would come to be known as the "objective
territoriality" principle in Strassheim v. Daily.Y Here Holmes stated
74. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402(c).
75. See Adelheid Puttler, Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law:
Jurisdiction to Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted by Aliens Abroad, in
EXTRATERRrTORIAL JURISDIcON IN THEORY AND PRAcricE 103, 107 (Karl M.
Meessen ed., 1996).
76. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, cmt. d.
77. See id.
78. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 783.
79. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
80. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome". Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 603 (1990).
81. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356.
82. See Deborah Sabalot Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust
Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 LoY. L. REv.
213,217 (1982).
83. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
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that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state
should succeed in getting him within its power."' Although the facts
of the Strassheim case were limited to a jurisdictional dispute among
two American states, federal courts thereafter would not be reluctant
to apply Justice Holmes' reasoning to events overseas.' Indeed, in
more recent times, that very quote from Strassheim was cited by the
district court in applying extraterritorial jurisdiction in the drug
trafficking case against Manuel Noriega.86
The principle of "objective territoriality" as initiated by Justice
Holmes continues to hold force in federal courts today, though it
sometimes receives different labelsY However, a formal "effects"
test for extraterritorial jurisdiction did not come into being until
Judge Hand's landmark 1945 opinion in the Alcoa case." In the case
of United States v. Aluminum Company of America' (Alcoa), Judge
Hand proclaimed that "it is settled law.., that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
84. Id. at 285. In a further irony, Justice Holmes cited his own opinion in
American Banana for this proposition, even though he refused to apply it in practice
in that case.
85. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 787-88; see also Mark Womack, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction - Mere Intent to Violate Criminal Statute Is Sufficient to Maintain
Jurisdiction Under the Objective Territorial Principle, 16 Thx. INT'L L. J. 149, 153
(1981).
86. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1257 (1992) (citing United States
v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
87. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 85, at 1257-58 (applying the label
"impact territoriality").
88. The scholarly literature does not seem to be consistent in its treatment of the
"effects" versus "objective territoriality" principles. Some sources seem to indicate
that they are essentially the same, or at most that the "effects" doctrine is a subset of
"objective territoriality." See, e.g., Estey, supra note 52, at 186; see also Turley, supra
note 80, at 615; see also Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 86, at 1245 (though, as noted
above in footnote 86, they substitute "impact territoriality" for "objective
territoriality"). Other sources seem to indicate that the two doctrines are in fact
separate, albeit similar theories. See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin & Michael R. Calabrese,
Coping with Extraterritoriality Disputes, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1988, at 16. The
Restatement acknowledges the confusion, but does nothing to resolve it:
"Jurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state, but having or intended to have
substantial effect within the state's territory, is an aspect of jurisdiction based on
territoriality, although it is sometimes viewed as a distinct category." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 58, § 402, cmt. d.
89. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends."' This was not the first case to mention effects, but
it was the first to make such effects the central question in the analysis
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a federal statute.9' Alcoa was
particularly significant in that the defendant was a foreign entity and
all the actions allegedly violating the Sherman Act occurred entirely
outside the United States.2 Thus, there was no theory upon which to
base jurisdiction other than something akin to an effects test. Though
Hand cited prior Supreme Court cases purporting to espouse an
effects test - including Strassheim3 - none of those involved a fact
pattern containing a foreign defendant and entirely extraterritorial
conduct.?
In many ways the legacy and influence of Alcoa in the area of
extraterritorial jurisdiction came to parallel that of International
Shoe' in the area of personal jurisdiction (decided in the same year as
Alcoa).' In the years since Judge Hand's opinion, the effects test of
Alcoa has undergone various modifications and has been the subject
of multiple, sometimes inconsistent, interpretations by the lower
courts.' Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the
permutations of the effects test which have arisen over the years, a
couple of developments are worth noting.
One source of criticism (or praise, depending on the speaker's
perspective) flowing from Alcoa has been the fact that Judge Hand's
methodology takes a "unilateral" approach to extraterritorial
jurisdiction - i.e. it focuses only on the applicability of U.S. law
without regard to the comparative applicability of the foreign state's
law.' In response, the 1970s saw a pair of Circuit courts adopt what
came to be known as the "balancing approach."" In the Ninth Circuit
90. Id. at443.
91. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARv. INT'L L.J. 101, 123-24 (Winter 1998).
92 See id. at 124.
93. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
94. See Dodge, supra note 90, at 126.
95. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
96. Though a decision of the Second Circuit, Alcoa essentially had the weight of a
Supreme Court decision. The case had been directly appealed to the Supreme Court,
but the Court "assigned" the case to the Second Circuit after six Justices disqualified
themselves from hearing the case. See Sabalot, supra note 82, at 218, n. 30.
97. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 80, at 611-12, n. 87-89.
98. See Dodge, supra note 91, at 126-27.
99. See id. at 127.
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case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,"90 the court,
though not dismissive of the effects test, stated that this test "by itself
is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. Nor
does it expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship
between the actors and this country."'' Writing for the Court, Judge
Choy substituted a test which has variously been labeled a
"conflicts,"'2 or more commonly, a "balancing"'' test. This test
includes an "intended effects analysis"" but goes further in asking
"whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a
matter of international comity and fairness."'0 5 This test was still not
satisfactory in the view of some countries since it continued to assume
that the U.S. may establish valid jurisdiction based solely upon the
effect in the U.S. of actions abroad - though it should choose not to
do so when the facts indicate a stronger foreign interest."
Nonetheless, the balancing approach represented a major
modification from Alcoa's effects test and addressed some concerns
from abroad.
Three years later, the Third Circuit essentially followed
Timberlane in yet another antitrust case, Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp7  Writing for the Court, Judge Weis declared the
Third Circuit test to be in "substantial agreement" with Judge Choy's
in Timberlane. In fact, Judge Weis went further and proffered a
laundry list of ten factors which "should be considered"' ' by a court
in deciding whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Despite
the fact that the courts were certainly not unanimous in their
adoption of this "balancing" test over the next decade,"9 it was
incorporated into section 403 of the Restatement in 1987Y The pure
100. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 611-12.
102. See Turley, supra note 80, at 612.
103. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 90, at 129; see also Sabalot, supra note 81, at 222-
23.
104. See Sabalot, supra note 81, at 221-22.
105. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613, 615 (emphasis omitted).
106. See generally Joseph P. Griffin, A Primer on Extraterritoriality, INT'L Bus.
LAw. Jan. 1985, at 23-24.
107. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 1297.
109. For decisions which specifically rejected this approach, see In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980), as well as Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
110. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 403, which lists a number of factors
similar in substance to those adopted in Timberlane and Mannington Mills; see also
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effects test from Alcoa, though never explicitly overruled, appeared
to be fairly moribund by the late 1980s.'
However, in 1993, the Supreme Court abruptly curtailed
whatever momentum the balancing approach may have had with its
decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.12 "With a few
qualifications, Justice Souter's majority opinion in Hartford adopted
the effects approach articulated by Judge Hand in Alcoa, not
Timberlane's balancing approach.""' Though Justice Souter cited
both section 402 and 403 of the Restatement in support of his
position, the majority functionally stresses section 402(c) over section
403's balancing factors..4 (even though section 402 specifically states
that its terms are "subject to" the limitations of section 403)." For
Justice Souter, extraterritorial jurisdiction will apply so long as the
U.S. has a sufficient interest in the matter and so long as the
extraterritorial conduct is intended to produce effects within the
U.S."'; if this is satisfied, a court may essentially disregard the interest
of the other nation(s) in asserting U.S. jurisdiction. Whether or not
Hartford spells the "demise" ' of the balancing test embodied in
Restatement § 403 remains to be seen, but it certainly represents the
clear re-establishment of an effects test which is largely at odds with
that approach.
As it currently stands, then, the effects basis for asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction remains perhaps the most far-reaching,
and most controversial theory underlying the extension of U.S. law to
events abroad. Nonetheless, it is no longer a uniquely American
theory; other developed nations, notably Germany,"9 have adopted it
Dodge, supra note 90, at 130-31.
111. See Dodge, supra note 90, at 134.
112. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
113. See Dodge, supra note 90, at 135.
114. See Estey, supra note 52, at 192.
115. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402.
116. See Dodge, supra note 90, at 137-38.
117. Without elaborating greatly, the Court does suggest that if an actor were
compelled by foreign law to take certain action which produces effects within the
U.S., this may validly serve as a reason to decline U.S. jurisdiction. See Hartford Fire
Insurance, 509 U.S. at 798-99.
118. See generally Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law:
The Demise of Restatement Section 403,89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (Jan. 1995).
119. See Luzius Wildhaber, The Continental Experience, in EXTRA-TERRTORIAL
APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO, 67 (Cecil Olmstead ed., 1984); see
also Frederick K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment
on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 40-41 (1988); see
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in a modified form, particularly in the restraint of trade area. And
while the genesis of the effects theory in this country was in antitrust
cases, as noted below,1" it has since spread to other fields, particularly
in the area of securities law.
C. The "Protective" Basis of Jurisdiction
The final two bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction of interest, the
"protective" and "passive personality" principles, will receive a more
limited treatment here - partly because they are invoked more
infrequently and partly because there is some overlap with the effects
basis of jurisdiction.
In general terms, the protective basis of jurisdiction permits the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction when acts committed abroad
are directed at the United States and in some manner threaten the
security or integrity of this country."' The Restatement has
incorporated this principle into section 402(3), which permits a state
to assert jurisdiction over "certain conduct outside its territory by
persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the
state or against a limited class of other state interests."' " Just exactly
how far that "limited class of state interests" extends is unclear."
While the paradigmatic activities covered by the protective principle
are probably espionage and terrorism," it has been construed to
cover areas which are less obviously vital to national security." Thus,
it would not be hard to imagine a court using this basis to extend
jurisdiction over "economic espionage" under the EEA, particularly
in cases involving high technology.
In practice, U.S. courts have fairly infrequently invoked the
protective basis to extend jurisdiction to acts committed abroad,
perhaps because it has variously been seen as a sub-category of the
effects 26 and objective territorial 27 principles. It has been subject to
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, reporters' Note 2.
120. See infra Part IV.B.
121. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 784.
122. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402(3).
123. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 389.
124. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 793.
125. The comments to the Restatement list - in addition to espionage -
counterfeiting, falsification of official documents, perjury before a consular officer,
and violations of immigration law as crimes for which the protective principle may
supply jurisdiction. Specifically excluded are acts of political expression, such as libel
of a state. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, cmt. f.
126. See id.
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severe criticism on the basis that its inherent vagueness allows a given
state to define what its vital interests are without any clear
guidelines.m Nonetheless, in recent years, a few appellate courts,
notably the Ninth129 and Second m Circuits, have demonstrated a
willingness to cite the protective principle in justifying extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
D. The "Passive Personality" Basis of Jurisdiction
Under this theory, a state may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
over conduct based solely upon the nationality of the victim of such
conduct." On the surface, it appears to be simply a natural extension
of the nationality principle; after all, if a state has an interest in
conduct by its nationals, then it would presumably have an interest in
conduct committed against its nationals. Not surprisingly, however,
its invocation is often controversial, and even the United States has
challenged its application.' Currently included within the language
of Restatement section 402(2), the passive personality principle
applies prototypically in the case of terrorist acts committed against
Americans abroad.'
As a general rule, the passive personality principle may apply
only to the most serious of crimes."m  Furthermore, while not
theoretically precluded under its terms, this principle apparently has
rarely, if ever, been applied to economic crimes committed abroad,
nor does it appear to apply to crimes committed against corporate
rather than natural persons. Hence, it is highly unlikely that it could
ever serve as the basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the EEA.
Indeed, some commentators believe it is an inappropriate doctrine for
any crime: "[i]t is hard to argue that it is fair to subject citizens of
127. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 791.
128. See id. at 792.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994);
see also United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also Chua Han Mow v. United States 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1981); see generally
Estey, supra note 52, at 202-03.
131. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 389.
132- See id.
133. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, cmt. g; and reporters' note 3.
Indeed, Congress based extraterritorial jurisdiction upon the passive personality
principle under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. See
id.
134. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 402, cmt. g.
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foreign nations to United States law simply because Americans
choose to travel abroad, yet the.., passive personality theory allows
precisely this result." '135 Still, in conjunction with other theories,
notably the protective theory, it could serve as a factor in favor of
U.S. jurisdiction.'6
IV. The Extraterritorial Reach of Selected Federal
Criminal Laws
Given the complete dearth of cases to date construing the extent
of the EEA's extraterritorial reach, it would be useful to compare the
courts' willingness to apply jurisdiction to conduct abroad under
other federal criminal laws. Thus, against the theoretical background
discussed in Part III, this section will briefly outline the current law
regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction in the fields of antitrust and
securities law. Since these represent the two most prominent areas of
economic crime applied extraterritorially, they are particularly
pertinent to our EEA analysis here. From these comparisons, we will
be able to draw a general outline of the extent of the EEA's
application to conduct abroad in Part V.
A. Antitrust Law Applied Extraterritorially
As should be evident from the theoretical discussion in Part III
above, much of the common law development with regard to the
jurisdictional limits of U.S. law abroad has occurred in the context of
antitrust litigation. Rather than rehash the historical development of
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, this section will
confine itself to an appraisal of the reach of U.S. antitrust law abroad
as it stands today.
The application of U.S. antitrust law to the entirely
extraterritorial conduct of foreign actors remains the most common -
and commonly criticized - example of the American imposition of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction.'37 The antitrust jurisdictional bases
covering conduct abroad have shifted back and forth this century
from a narrow territorial refusal to extend antitrust law under
American Banana, to the adoption of the effects test under Alcoa, to
135. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 86, at 1255.
136. See Petersen, supra note 61, at 797.
137. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARv. L. RaV. 1310, 1312-14 (1985) [hereinafter
Predictability and Comity].
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the balancing approach under Timberlane/Mannington Mills and the
Restatement (3d), to the re-emergence of the effects test most
recently under Hartford Fire Insurance. In light of all this, the
following represents an outline of the current law on the subject.
Pursuant to Hartford, we start with the general rule that if
actions taken abroad produce a substantial anti-competitive effect
within this country, the assertion of jurisdiction over such conduct by
an American court is proper." Need the resulting effect have been
intended by its perpetrators? Under the original effects doctrine in
Alcoa, the answer was yes - but there was no liability unless the
intended conduct actually produced the desired result."9 Alcoa did
not address the alternative scenario: where the foreign perpetrators
produced the effect without the intent.' Cases subsequent to Alcoa
tended to relax the intent requirement such that once the effects were
demonstrably linked to the defendant, intent was presumed.141 It does
not appear as though Hartford has altered the intent requirement.
The facts of Hartford clearly indicated the intent of the foreign
defendants to violate U.S. antitrust law; hence, the Court did not have
to go further than to say that "it is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States.''142 Thus, it remains unclear to what extent the courts would be
willing to extend jurisdiction in the (concedediy rare) case of
unintended anti-competitive effects within the U.S. In this regard the
U.S. Justice Department has stated in its Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines that "the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S.
consumers, markets, or exporters" is one factor to consider in
deciding whether it will prosecute a foreign defendant.43
This brings us to one last question concerning extraterritorial
jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust law: Does Hartford render the
balancing approach of Timberlane and the Restatement obsolete?
The answer, in a nutshell, is that Hartford certainly weakened but did
not altogether gut the balancing approach. The Hartford majority did
138. See Estey, supra note 52, at 192.
139. See Courtney G. Lytle, A Hegemonic Interpretation of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in Antitrust" From American Banana to Hartford Fire, 24 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 41,58-59 (1997).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 59.
142. Hartford Fire Insurance, 509 U.S. at 796.
143. See Lytle, supra note 138, at 70.
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ignore most of the balancing factors enshrined in Restatement §403,
but it never specifically rejected §403's utility either. In fact, Justice
Souter selectively cited §403 for the proposition that "where a person
subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both,"
either state may legitimately assert jurisdiction."1 ' Further, the Court
did not apply an entirely "pure" effects test: it did consider the factors
of "substantiality of effect" and "likelihood of conflict with another
nation." With regard to the latter factor, the Court essentially
fashioned an escape from extraterritorial jurisdiction if the foreign
defendant were required by local law to take certain positive action
which in turn violates U.S. law.'45 In other words, the mere legality of
conduct abroad will not per se spare a foreign defendant from U.S.
jurisdiction."
If nothing else, Hartford reversed a trend from the seventies and
eighties toward the reining in of American antitrust jurisdiction, and
it instead contributed to the trend over the last decade of expanding
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.47 The next
question then is to what extent the courts' approach under antitrust
law has carried over to other types of federal economic crimes, most
notably in the area of securities law.
B. Federal Securities Law Applied Extraterritorially
Since the legislative histories of the twin bases of securities law -
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 -
were silent as to application abroad, the courts originally relied upon
the presumption against extraterritoriality in refusing to assert
jurisdiction over conduct overseas.'" The extension of antitrust
144. See Hartford Fire Insurance, 509 U.S. at 799.
145. See id.
146. Quite possibly, the Hartford decision has, in the years since its issuance, had
the effect of emboldening the circuit courts to uphold jurisdiction in antitrust cases
where they would not have previously. For example, the First Circuit in United States
v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1997), approved jurisdiction in a criminal
antitrust action against a Japanese defendant even though all of the allegedly
criminal acts occurred overseas. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Michael
Bishop, Note, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Criminal Application of
the Sherman Act Abroad, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 271 (1999); see also
Leigh Robin Lamendola, Note, The Continuing Transformation of International
Antitrust Law and Policy: Criminal Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act in
United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 663
(1999).
147. See Trimble, supra note 118, at 56.
148. See Estey, supra note 52, at 186. Some courts also felt constrained by a
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extraterritorial jurisdiction in Alcoa did not immediately have an
impact on the securities laws. But by the late 1960s, courts began to
apply the effects doctrine to federal securities cases.149 The effects
doctrine in the securities law context, which is often applied in
antifraud cases," is based on the assumption that Congress really
intended to legislate against any conduct calculated to violate
securities laws within the U.S., wherever perpetrated."' The first
appellate court to adopt the effects doctrine in a securities law case
was the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook; other circuits
followed soon thereafter. 53
The effects doctrine remains the cornerstone of extraterritorial
jurisdiction today and is probably the only one of the traditional
theories discussed above in Part III which per se justifies the assertion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the securities laws. The passive
personality principle in rare cases has served as a supplemental basis
for jurisdiction,"M probably in fewer cases even than under antitrust
law. Likewise, the protective principle, while not theoretically
precluded, has had almost no role in the assertion of securities law
jurisdiction to events abroad. After all, "[c]apital transactions or
regulation occurring abroad almost never prejudice national
security .... 155 Finally, the nationality basis of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, while valid in a securities law setting, is not often
invoked, except perhaps as a supplemental basis to the effects
doctrine. If a U.S. national takes action abroad which produces no
breach of American securities laws, the U.S. has no interest in the
matter; if such national's actions abroad do violate U.S. law, then
normally the foreign country has no objection to U.S. assertion of
provision in the Exchange Act which stated that the act did not apply to business
transactions "without the jurisdiction of the United States." See Turley, supra note
80, at 614 n.100. Of course, since the courts themselves set the limits of U.S.
jurisdiction, it is probably not surprising that a court determined to extend the
Exchange Act to events abroad would not find the above provision to be a major
obstacle.
149. See Estey, supra note 52, at 186-87.
150. The courts have rarely, if ever, applied any other provisions of the Exchange
Act, such as its registration requirements, extraterritorially. See Turley, supra note
80, at 614 n.103.
151. See Predictability and Comity, supra note 136, at 1315 n.29.
152. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
153. See Predictability and Comity, supra note 136, at 1315 n.29.
154. See Gunnar Schuster, Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic
Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165,186-87 (1994).
155. Id- at 188.
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jurisdiction (unless, perhaps, the national works for a subsidiary
incorporated abroad). 6
Hence, we are again left with the effects basis of jurisdiction as
the primary foundation for extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S.
securities laws. Most federal courts are willing to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction under an effects test which substantially
mirrors the "intended effects" test as originally developed under
Alcoa in the antitrust setting.
57
In addition, however, the Second Circuit in the 1970's developed
a secondary test specifically for securities law cases: the conduct test.
Announced in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell,'58 and refined in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. , this test
generally supplements rather than substitutes for the effects test.
Under this doctrine, a court examines that part of the fraudulent
conduct which occurred within the U.S.; if such conduct represents an
"essential link in the preparation of a fraudulent scheme," U.S.
jurisdiction will generally be proper even if the majority of the
activity took place abroad.1" "Under the conduct test, therefore, a
securities transaction might have little effect within the United States,
but still trigger extraterritorial application." 6' More recently, the
Second Circuit clarified the conduct test by stating that a U.S. court
will have jurisdiction if (1) defendant's activities were more than
merely preparatory to securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2)
such activities or failures to act within the U.S. directly caused the
losses in question.' 62
Following the lead of the Second Circuit, at least four other
circuits have considered and adopted a conduct test for the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law, although a couple of
those circuits require a less substantial amount of "conduct" to occur
within the U.S. to assert jurisdiction."6 Still, it is the rare securities
156. See id. at 185-86.
157. See Turley, supra note 80, at 613-14.
158. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
159. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
160. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities
Laws Regulation, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 207,215-16 (1985/1986).
161. See Turley, supra note 80, at 616.
162. See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Estey, supra note 52, at 188-89.
163. See generally Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational
Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 LoY. U. Cm.
L.J. 679 (1999) (discussing more recent refinements of the effects and conduct tests
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law case in which the court asserts jurisdiction even though the effect
within the U.S. is negligible or non-existent. Unfortunately, there has
been no securities law equivalent of the Supreme Court antitrust
decision in Hartford. Hence, the extent to which the conduct test
supplements the effects test in applying U.S. securities law
extraterritorially depends to some measure upon the circuit in which
the complaint is filed. But then again, unlike the antitrust setting,
over the last three decades there has been fairly little debate about
the scope and the applicability of the effects test itself in securities law
cases: if the fraudulent effect occurs within the U.S., American
securities law will apply.
V. Potential Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Issues
Under the EEA
On the surface, given Congress' clear intent to apply the statute
extraterritorially, and given the above theoretical and common law
bases for applying U.S. law to conduct abroad, it would seem that the
potential application of the EEA to events overseas is almost
limitless. After all, under an expansive reading of the passive
personality principle, any act committed anywhere for the purpose of
stealing an American trade secret produces an American victim, upon
which jurisdiction could theoretically be based. Alternatively, one
could argue that the theft of American trade secrets anywhere in the
world is intended to produce an effect within the U.S. Finally, under
the protective principle, the U.S. could claim that the theft of
important high-tech trade secrets anywhere represents a national
security threat (though this option most likely would require a charge
of foreign governmental involvement under section 1831).
In reality, all of these expansive assertions of extraterritoriality
are tempered by Congress' stated requirement that there be "an act
in furtherance of the offense" committed within the U.S.
164
Nonetheless, depending on the alleged offense, it is easy to foresee
the courts applying the above requirement loosely. This section
explores which events might trigger jurisdiction under section 1837 of
the EEA, which case scenarios present the highest probability of
prosecution under that section, and then offers some suggestions
by a number of the circuit courts of appeals); see also Hermann, supra note 160, at
220-22.
164. See H. R. REP. No. 104-788, at 5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,
4033.
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about certain precautionary measures that companies may take.
For American companies operating abroad, the extraterritorial
application of the EEA is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it
has the potential to provide a remedy in U.S. courts for a theft of
trade secrets occurring almost entirely outside the U.S. (subject to the
"act in furtherance" requirement as well as the necessity of
establishing in personam jurisdiction). On the other hand, there is no
"act in furtherance" requirement whatsoever for U.S. entities: any
U.S. national, permanent resident, U.S. corporate entity, or U.S.
organization "subtantially owned or controlled" by U.S. citizens or
permanent residents is subject to the terms of the EEA worldwide."
Thus, a U.S. permanent resident employed abroad who attempts to
unlawfully appropriate the trade secret of an American company (or,
at least in theory, a foreign company) located abroad is subject to
criminal prosecution under the EEA. This, of course, is founded
upon the nationality basis of jurisdiction. With the possible exception
of jurisdictional assertions against entities "substantially owned or
controlled by" U.S. citizens, this represents an internationally
recognized basis for jurisdiction. In reality, however, it is highly
unlikely that the government would attempt to assert jurisdiction
over U.S. nationals abroad under the EEA where the target of their
thievery is not also a U.S. national.' 6
What steps then should American companies with subsidiaries or
joint ventures abroad pursue? Without doubt, such companies -
particularly in high-tech fields - should educate their employees
regarding the severe criminal sanctions which may apply for theft of
trade secrets both in the U.S. and abroad.1 67 Such education, which
should take place upon the hiring and departure of employees, can
serve multiple purposes: first, to make clear that (assuming they are
U.S. nationals) the statute will follow them wherever they go; and
secondly, it will reinforce the need to maintain the secrecy of the
company's trade secrets, without which there can be no prosecution
under the EEA (and often no civil remedy either)."6 Indeed, the
165. See id.
166. See Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 305, 314 (1998); see also Hoken S. Seki & Peter J. Toren, EEA Violations
Could Trigger Criminal Sanctions, 19 NAT'L L.J. at B8.
167. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A New
Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
191,205 (1997).
168. See id. at 205-06.
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employer should also instruct its employees to report any trade secret
theft immediately in order to prevent the information from becoming
public in any way.'69 In addition, such education must stress the
potential personal and corporate criminal liability which can result
from any use of the trade secrets of other companies - even if such
information was offered officiously by an employee of a rival
company (i.e. without any active solicitation or other misbehavior).70
As a result, employers (both U.S. and foreign) should assiduously
screen any new employees who arrive bearing documents or materials
from previous employers (assuming their prior employer was a U.S.
person).' Perhaps one final piece of advice for U.S. entities
operating abroad is appropriate: don't relax now that the EEA is in
force. The EEA simply will not help if the perpetrator of trade secret
theft abroad is not a U.S. national. Even if such perpetrator in some
way committed an act in furtherance within the U.S. (e.g. a phone call
or an e-mail), if he is not physically within the U.S., he may be
immune from prosecution. Even if the country in which the
defendant is located has an extradition treaty with the U.S., it is
highly questionable whether it would extradite a defendant to face
charges under such a uniquely American criminal statute.
As for foreign corporations, the EEA will affect different entities
differently. If a foreign company possesses no operations in the U.S.
and engages in trade secret theft against a U.S. entity entirely outside
the U.S., then the EEA cannot apply.' In that respect, the
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the EEA may fall short of the
jurisdictional reach applied under a "pure" effects test in antitrust law
- where the Sherman Act can reach conduct entirely extraterritorial
169. See Mark Grossman, Keeping Your Data Safe from Spies, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
21, 1998, at 57; see also Savage & Bauer, supra note 30, at 21.
170. Such a scenario is covered by sections 1831(a)(3) and 1832(a)(3) of the EEA,
which impose criminal penalties on a person who "receives" trade secret information
knowing that it was stolen or obtained without authorization.
171. See generally Victoria A. Cundiff, Avoiding Prosecution under the Economic
Espionage Act, in P.L.I.'s FIFTH ANNuAL INSTrrUTE FOR INTELECTUAL PROPERTY
LAw 1999, at 574, 587 (P.L.I. Patents, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. GO-007N, 1999).
172. Even if such a foreign corporation does have a U.S. presence, the EEA will
not apply if every act in furtherance of the alleged trade secret theft from an
American corporation occurs outside the U.S. The problem is that a substantial U.S.
presence would greatly increase the chance that some small act in furtherance of the
crime, such as use of the telephone or e-mail, could occur within the U.S. - which
may be enough to grant jurisdiction under § 1837. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 166, at
314.
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in nature. The "act in furtherance" requirement imposed by
Congress more closely resembles the conduct test developed by the
Second Circuit in the securities law cases, with a couple of twists.
First, though there is some disagreement among the circuits which
apply the conduct test,73 the "act in furtherance" in the securities case
likely needs to be more substantive than under the EEA. Secondly,
many of the circuit courts in a securities case will disregard the
conduct test (i.e. will not require U.S.-based conduct) if the effect
within the U.S. is significant enough, something the courts applying
the EEA will not be able to do.
So what steps should foreign entities take under the EEA to
avoid liability? Much of the advice to U.S. persons above may
potentially apply to foreign entities as well. Certainly, if such an
entity has any significant presence in the U.S., even in the form of a
joint venture with a U.S. entity, education regarding the EEA similar
to that specified above would be wise. Many other nations do not
provide civil remedies, much less criminal sanctions, for trade secret
misappropriation.'74 Thus, many foreign employees working abroad,
and even some working within the U.S., may be unaware that such
misappropriation is broadly defined under U.S. law and that it may
subject themselves and their employers to criminal liability. It
remains to be seen how quickly they will learn the lesson and how
willing the DOJ will be to punish them if they do not.
VI. Conclusion
Though there is relatively little evidence on the point to date, the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 by its terms has the potential to join
the antitrust and securities laws as one of the most important and
effective federal statutes in the area of economic crimes. Given the
theoretical and practical issues outlined above, in conjunction with
the clear Congressional mandate under section 1837 of the Act, the
jurisdictional reach of the EEA also has the potential to rival that of
the above-mentioned areas of law.
173. See supra, Part IV.B.
174. See Seki & Toren, supra note 166 (noting that in some countries, certain
activities proscribed by the EEA are either legal under local law or arguably
protected (during a specified transition period) by the terms of the 1994 TRIPs
Agreement - a source of potential friction if and when U.S. courts finally invoke §
1837). See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Essay, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be
Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL.
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However, even if federal prosecutors come to use the EEA
extensively, it could be quite a few years before there is a developed
common law which limits its extraterritorial scope (after all, it took
decades for such law to develop under the antitrust and securities
statutes). In the meantime, there will be much uncertainty in this
area. Counsel here and abroad will need to pay attention to the
courts and the actions of the Justice Department, but they will also
have to recommend certain precautionary actions in anticipation of
the courts' decisions - thus ensuring that it is not their client in court
setting the precedent!

